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Abstract
This study aims to measure the impact of liberalization on the efficiency of electricity production in Japan,
and to examine whether or not economies of scope exist between electricity generation and transmission. 
Since 1995, liberalization of the electricity market in Japan has been phased in and regulations on entry have
been relaxed three times. One motivation for these regulatory changes has been to improve the efficiency of 
electricity production by introducing competition.  Using a panel data set on the nine main power companies 
in Japan over the period 1970-2010, estimates of fixed-effects and stochastic frontier models of the cost
function are obtained and compared. Estimates of the cost function show that liberalization has improved cost 
efficiency.  Economies of scope are found to exist for all firms.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Recently inefficiencies in the Japanese electricity market have been the focus of some attention.  In
particular, even though the liberalization of the electricity market has been phased in and regulations on entry
have been relaxed three times since the 1990s, the monopolistic nature of the Japanese electricity market has
been the subject of much discussion since the Management and Coordination Agency in Japan (Soumu-cho) 
suggested the enegry liberalization.  There has also been some discussion of the possible separation of 
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electricity generation  and  transmission.  For example, Goto and Inoue (2012) measure the economies of 
scope between generation and  transmission in Japan to examine the effectiveness of diversification in the 
Japanese electricity industry. This study aims to measure the impact of recent liberalizations on the efficiency 
of electricity production in Japan, and to examine whether or not economies of scope exist between electricity 
generation and transmission. 
A huge literature has examined whether or not inefficiencies exist in various industries including the 
electricity industry. To estimate either a production function or a cost function, papers in the literature either 
use a parametric approach or a non-parametric approach.  Papers using a parametric approach tend to estimate 
the cost function rather than the production function because there are endogeneity problems associated with 
input choices when estimating a production function.  
For the electricity industry in Japan there are three key papers. Using data from 1982 to 1998, Kuwabara 
and Ida (2000) estimate a translog cost function for the Japanese electric companies together using share 
equations.  Kuwabara and Ida (2000) aim to measure the extent of economies of scale and economies of scope 
in the electricity industry in Japan, but they do not examine the impact of the liberalization measures that have 
been implemented.  Using data from 1982 to 1997, Nemoto and Goto (2006) estimate a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) cost function and measure the technical and allocative efficiencies of Japanese 
transmission-distribution electricity.  Their results show the existence of technical and allocative inefficiency.  
The observed costs are 9 to 48% higher than the efficient level.  Goto and Inoue (2012) estimate a composite 
cost function for the Japanese electric companies using data between 1990 and 2008.  Goto and Inoue do not 
use the translog cost function, but rather use a composite cost function which enables them to measure the 
economies of vertical integration, which includes both the effects of economies of scale and economies of 
scope, in electricity production.   
Papers using a non-parametric approach typically employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  Tsutsui 
(2000) measures the inefficiencies of Japanese electric companies using the Malmquist Index, and then 
compares the estimated inefficiencies of Japanese electric power companies with those of the U.S. companies 
between 1992 and 2000.  Although his results show that Japanese firms are more efficient than U.S. firms, 
Tsutsui does not examine the impact of the electricity liberalization.  One disadvantage of the DEA approach 
is that the statistical significance of the input variables cannot be evaluated.  Hence, the impact of the 
liberalization cannot be examined via DEA statistically.  Hattori, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005) measure the 
efficiencies of electricity distribution in the U.K. and Japan between 1985 and 1998, via not only SFA but also 
DEA.  Their results show that the Japanese electricity system is less efficient than the U.K. system.  Their data 
period contains only the first electricity liberalization in Japan though Japan experienced three electricity 
liberalizations in total up to now. 
As can be seen from this brief literature survey, the impact of the relaxation of entry restrictions on the 
inefficiency of Japanese electric companies via SFA has not been examined to date.  The first contribution of 
this study is to examine the impact of the liberalization in the Japanese electricity market by estimating a 
translog cost function directly.  The second contribution of this paper is to measure the economies of scope, 
using estimates of this translog cost function which are obtained by stochastic frontier analysis.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an outline of the key liberalizations of the 
electricity market that have been implemented in Japan.  Section 3 discusses the empirical models used to 
examine the impact of these liberalizations and how this model can be used to check for existence of 
economies of scope between electricity generation and electricity transmission, while section 4 details the 
definitions of the variables used and the data sources.  Estimation results are reported in section 5, and section 
6 contains a conclusion. 
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2. Liberalization of the Electricity Market in Japan 
Since 1995, liberalization of the electricity market in Japan has been phased in and the regulations on entry 
have been relaxed three times.  This liberalization aimed to improve the structural efficiency of firms in the 
industry and to reduce electricity bills that were said to be higher than the average electricity bill paid by 
consumers in foreign countries (Yamaguchi (2007)). Prior to 1995, Japan was divided into ten geographic 
regions, and within each region a monopoly on power generation and distribution was allocated to one general 
electric power utility.  As a result, there are ten general electric power utilities (GEU) in Japan.  Even though 
wholesale electricity utilities (WEU) were also allowed to generate electric power, WEUs could only supply 
electric power to GEUs in the wholesale market.  Similarly, private power generation (PPG) could supply 
electricity to GEUs.  The ten GEUs each engaged in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity 
within their respective geographical regions.  According to Yamaguchi (2007), after the collapse of Japan’s 
overheated stock and real estate markets in the early 1990s, higher electricity bills in Japan compared to those 
paid by consumers in foreign countries became an issue. The Japanese government aimed to improve the 
efficiency of electricity production by introducing competition into the electric power market. 
Table 1 shows the main points of recent revisions of the Electricity Business Act.   First, the Act was 
revised to enable wholesale suppliers (WS), for example, to enter the wholesale markets for electricity supply.  
This revision was enacted in December 1995.  The typical example of a WS is an independent power producer 
(IPP).  In this context, the wholesale market for electricity refers to the generation of electricity in Japan.  The 
electricity generated by the new entrants was sold to the general power companies, and then supplied to 
consumers through the transmission sectors owned and operated by the general electricity utilities.  Since the 
first revision of the Electricity Business Act, the specified electricity utilities (SEU), who have a duty to 
generate, distribute, and sell electricity only for the specified areas, have started to generate and distribute 
electricity.  However, SEUs have been in the independent market.  In March 2000, the Electricity Business 
Act, was revised again so that power producer and suppliers (PPS) could enter the retail markets for electricity, 
that is, PPS could sell electricity directly to consumers.  This revision permitted new entry of suppliers into the 
retail market for electricity for consumers with an electric power contract of over 2,000 kW.  The remaining 
part of the retail market, that is, for small contract consumers, was maintained as a monopoly of the relevant 
regional electric power company.  That is why this second revsion is called a partial liberalizaiton.  In 2003, 
the Electricity Business Act was revised for the third time to allow entry of producers  into the retail market 
for consumers with an electric power contract of over 500 kW in April 2004, and then where each consumer’s 
electric power contract was over 50 kW in April 2005.  In short, this revision expanded the sections of the 
retail market where the PPSs could enter.  That is why the third revision is called an expansion of the partial 
liberalization.   Moreover, the market rules for electricity transmission sector and the watchdog organization 
were established to realize fair deals. 
An examination of how the retail market shares of various operators have changed after the electricity 
liberalization began shows that the maximum of market share of the PPSs was 0.74 % after the PPS entered 
the retail market.  The ten main electric power companies have been able to maintain a market share of 70 – 
80 % even since the electricity liberalization.  However, as a result of new entry, electricity prices have fallen.  
After the electricity liberalization began, average prices tended to decline.  This fact suggests that the 
existence of innovation by competition might lead to lower prices. 
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Table 1. The main points of revisions of the electricity business act
Year
Generation Wholesale
Market
Distribution & Sales Liberalized Retail Market The Other 
Lighting
Sector
Industry
Sector
January 1970 -
March, 1995
GEU
WEU
PPG
WEU
PPG
GEU
April, 1995 -
February, 1999
GEU
WEU
PPG
WS (IPP etc.)
WEU
PPG
WS (IPP etc.)
GEU SEU
March, 2000 -
March, 2003
GEU
W EU
PPG
WS (IPP etc.)
WEU
PPG
WS (IPP etc.)
GEU
PPS
Over 2,000 kW
April, 2004 -
March, 2005
Over 500 kW
April, 2005 Over 50 kW
Source: Constructed by the author based on information on Tokyo Electric’s web site (http://www.tepco.co.jp)
3. Model
Assume that in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity there are three inputs, labor,
capital and fuel, and two outputs, the generation of electricity, and the transmission and distribution of 
electricity. These inputs and outputs are assumed to be related by a translog cost function.  The number of 
inputs and the number of outputs are defined following Goto and Inoue (2012).  The outputs are measured as
the total quantity electric power sold in a fiscal year and the total length of transmission routes, respectively. 
This assumption makes it easier to estimate the economies of scope between the generation and transmission 
& distribution sectors.  To measure the inefficiency due to technical factors, a stochastic frontier version of 
the translog cost function is employed.  Once the symmetry of the second derivatives of the cost function with 
respect to two different input prices is taken into account, the stochastic frontier translog cost function can be 
written as follows:
(1)
(2)
where ܶܥ௜௧ is the total cost of the i-th firm at time , ݕ௝ ௜௧ is the quantity of the j-th output for the i-th firm 
at time , ݌௞ ௜௧ is the observed price of the k-th input for the i-th firm at time , ܦ௦௧ is a 0-1 dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if at time the s-th change of the electricity liberalization has been implemented
(s=1,2,3), ݐ is a time trend, ݐ݄݁ݎ݈݉ܽ ௜௧ is the ratio of thermal power generation to hydroelectric
generationfor the i-th firm at time , ݊ݑ݈ܿ݁ܽݎ௜௧ is the ratio of nuclear power generation to hydroelectric
generation for the i-th firm at time , ݊݁ݓ௜௧ is the ratio of new energy generation to hydroelectric generation
for the i-th firm at time , ߙ௝ , ߚ௞ , ߛ௝௟ , ߜ௞௠ , ߩ௝௞ , ߬௦ , ߮௧௛௘௥௠௔௟ , ߮௡௨௖௟௘௔௥ , and ߮௡௘௪ are coefficients to be 
estimated, ݑ௜௧ is the inefficiency term for the i-th firm at time , and ݒ௜௧ is a standard disturbance.  In this
model, it is assumed that all firms have the same production technology.
716   Miyuki Taniguchi /  Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  712 – 721 
Baumol, Panzar and Willing (1982) define economies of scope as being complementary if
డమ்஼
డ௬భడ௬మ ൏ Ͳ.  (3)
where for convenience, the  i and t subscripts denoting the firm number and time are omitted.  One 
interpretation of equation (3) is that for the costs of output i and output j to be complementary, the marginal 
cost of each output declines when the amount of the other output increases.  The second derivative on the left 
hand side of equation (3) can be computed using (1) as:
(4)
In equation (4), ቀ ்஼௬భ௬మቁ is always positive because TC, ݕଵ, and ݕଶ are all positive.  Therefore, to see if (4) is 
satisfied, it is only necessary to examine the sign of the following expression:
ܵܥ ଵܲଶ ൌ ߛଵଶ ൅ ሺߙଵ ൅ ߛଵଵ  ݕଵ ൅ ߛଵଶ  ݕଶ ൅ ߩଵଵ  ݌ଵ ൅ ߩଵଶ  ݌ଶ ൅ ߩଵଷ  ݌ଷሻሺߙଶ ൅ ߛଶଶ  ݕଶ ൅ ߛଵଶ  ݕଵ ൅ ߩଶଵ  ݌ଵ ൅ߩʹʹ݌ʹ൅ߩʹ͵݌͵
(5)
Since this is a function of unknown parameters and the values of the explanatory variables, it needs to be
evaluated using estimates of the paramteres and the sample values of the explanatory variables.
In equation (2) assuming ݑ௜௧=0 leads to a pooling model.  Since the data used to estimate the cost
function are panel data, it is natural to estimate equation (2) allowing for individual firm effects that are either 
fixed or random effects. In this case, ݑ௜௧ is a time-invariant random variable that is (not) correlated with the
explanatory variables for the fixed (random) effects model. In addition to these standard panel models, some
stochastic frontier models are estimated in this study to consider the possiblility of the existence of the 
stochastic inefficiencies. To try and capture any cost inefficiencies, two models are assumed, the pooling
Stochastic Frontier (SF) model and the fixed-effects SF model, and can be written as follows†;
Pooling Stochastic Frontier Model
 ୧୲ ൌ ሺήሻ ൅  ൅ ୧୲ǡ ̱ܪܰ൫Ͳǡ ɐஜଶ൯ǡ ୧୲̱ܰሺͲǡ ɐ୴ଶሻ                                                                              (6)
Fixed-Effects SF Model
    ୧୲ ൌ ሺήሻ ൅ Ƀ௜ ൅ ୧ ൅ ୧୲ǡ ୧̱ ܪܰ൫Ͳǡ ɐஜଶ൯ǡ ୧୲̱ܰሺͲǡ ɐ୴ଶሻ                                                                   (7)
where , and ୧ are measures of technical inefficiency, ୧୲ is standard disturbance, ߞ௜ is the individual fixed
effect, ୧ is the number of periods in their balanced panel data, ܰ and NH denote a nornal distribution and
halfnormal distribution respectively. It should be noted that models (6) and (7) are non-nested models. The 
† Two other models, the Random-effects Stochastic Frontier model and the Battese and Coelli Time Varying
Stochastic Frontier model, were considered, but sensible estimates could not be obtained, so no estimates are
reported.
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pooling model and the fixed effects models can be obtained as a special case of equations (6) and (7),
respectively, imposing the restrictionɐஜଶ ൌ Ͳ.The standard random effect model and either equation (6) or (7) 
are non-nested models.
4. Data
Data on the corporate accounts of the ten general electricity utilities are drawn from the “Electricity 
Statistics Information (Denryoku Toukeijouhou)” published by the  Federation of Electric Power Companies
of Japan (http://www.fepc.or.jp).  Though ten general electricitiy utilities have existed in Japan since 1970,
Okinawa Electric Power Company is excluded from the analysis in this study.  The reason for this is that 
electricity production by Okinawa Electric has some important characteristics that differ from other 
companies.  For example, the scale of electricity production at Okinawa Electric P is much smaller than at the
other companies.  In addition, Okinawa Electric is the only general electricity utility not using nuclear energy 
for electric power generation.  Finally, the prefecture of Okinawa is made up of a number of small islands
where Okinawa Electric is obliged to generate and supply electricity.  As a result, it is thought that Okinawa 
Electric Power Company has a unique production function and a unique cost function. Hence, a balanced 
panel data set consisting of annual data on the other nine general electricitiy utilities from 1970 to 2010 is
used.
 is total costs and is measured in million yen. The output in the electricity generation sector, ݕଵ, is 
defined as the total quantity of electric power sold to consumers in the lighting and power sections (MWh). 
The output in the transmission sector, ݕଶ, is defined as the length in kilometers of the transmission route
including both overhead and underground routes. The unit fuel cost, ݌ଵ (million yen), is defined as
݌ଵ௜௧ ൌ ሺ  ሻ௜௧Ȁሺ    ሻ௜௧.   (10)
The gross fixed capital is employed for the cost of capital, ݌ଶ (million yen) in this study.  It is defined as
݌ଶ௜௧ ൌ ሺ୧୲ 
	୧୲ିଵΤ ሻ ൅ ୲,            (11)

	୧୲ିଵ ൌ 	୧୲ିଵ ൅ 	୧୲ିଵ ൅ ୧୲ିଵ,                   (12)
where ݌ଶ௜௧ is the cost of capital for the i-th firm in year , ୧୲ is the depreciation expenses for the i-th firm 
in year t, 
	୧୲ିଵ is the gross fixed capital for the i-th firm in year  െ ͳ, ୲ is the long-term prime rate for 
loans made by the main Japanese banks in year , 	୧୲ିଵ is the electric utility’s fixed assets for the i-th firm 
in year  െ ͳ, 	୧୲ିଵ is the fixed assets in process for the i-th firm in year  െ ͳ, and ୧୲ିଵ is investment and
other assets for the i-th firm in year  െ ͳ.  Data on the long-term prime rate for loans made by the main 
Japanese banks are drawn from the “Bank of Japan Statistics” published by Bank of Japan.  The personal
expenses per worker per year, ݌ଷ (million yen), is defined as
݌ଷ௜௧䠙ሺ ሻ ௜௧Ȁ ሺ   ሻ௜௧.       (13)
Dummy variables are defined to take account of the three revsions of the Electricity Business Act
discussed in section 2. ଵ is a 0 - 1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 in 1995 – 2010, ଶ is a 0 - 1 dummy
variable taking the value of 1 in 2001 – 2010, and ଷ is a 0 - 1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 in 2004
– 2010.
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Table 2 provides desciptive statistics on all the relevant variables. The variables LNC, LNY1, LNY2, 
LNP1, LNP2, and LNP3 in Table 2 refer to the natural logs of TC, ݕଵ, ݕଶ, ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, ݌ଷ, respectively. 
                                       Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LNC 13.588 0.992 10.874 15.682 
LNY1 17.684 0.847 15.817 19.511 
LNY2 8.977 0.594 7.829 9.957 
LNP1 -3.734 0.546 -5.256 -2.685 
LNP2 1.543 0.631 0.472 2.299 
LNP3 2.041 0.505 0.676 2.751 
D1 0.390 0.488 0 1 
D2 0.244 0.430 0 1 
D3 0.171 0.377 0 1 
LNT 7.596 0.006 7.586 7.606 
THERMAL 5.699 3.159 0.537 17.145 
NUCLEAR 2.639 2.791 0.000 12.955 
NEW 0.026 0.083 0.000 0.462 
 
5. Result and discussion 
LIMDEP 9.0 (Greene (2005)) is used obtain all the estimates presented in Table 3.  In all models in Table 
3 (Models A - E), the coefficients of three dummy variables associated with the electricity liberalization are 
negative and significant.  This suggests that the three entry liberalizations have had some impact in cutting 
costs.  The estimated coefficients associated with the time trend are positive and significant in all models. 
While technical innovation might be expected to lead to reductions in the cost of generation over time, stricter 
environmental and safety standards can be expected to have increased production costs over time. The 
coefficients of the ratio of thermal power, nuclear power, and new energy to hydroelectric power differ 
between the non-frontier models and the frontier models.  In both non-frontier models and frontier models, the 
coefficients of thermal power are positive and significant in models A, D, and E, but insignificant in models B 
and C.  Before the coefficients of nuclear power and new energy are discussed, the models are specified.   
In choosing between the usual panel models and frontier models, frontier models (Models D and E) are 
supported because the estimates of λ are positive and significant in all cases; both models suggest that there is 
a statistically significant inefficiency.  When the results for the pooling SF models (Model D) and the fixed-
effects SF models (Models E) are compared, the fixed-effects SF model (Models E) appears to be the more 
acceptable model . This can be seen from a simple comparison of the log likelihoods for the two models.   
To determine whether economies of scope exist, estimates from the fixed-effects model (Model C) are 
used.  In the fixed-effect model, the assumption that the cost function is increasing function in ݕଵǡ ݕଶǡ ݌ଵǡ ݌ଶ, 
and ݌ଷ is satisfied.  Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics for estimates of ܵܥ ଵܲଶ for each power utility.  
Since the mean of the estimates of  ܵܥ ଵܲଶ  for each power utility is positive, these results suggest that 
economies of scope exist between the generation sector and tranmission sector for electricity on average. 
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              Table 3. Estimated results 
Model Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
Pooling Random-effects Fixed-effects Pooling SF Fixed-effects SF 
㻌  㻌  㻌  
Constant -211.725 -192.602 㻌  -186.749 㻌  
㻌  (45.918)*** (44.679)*** 㻌  (42.010)*** 㻌  
LNY1 1.828 0.791 0.618 1.516 1.878 
㻌  (0.598)*** (1.104) (1.507) (0.549)*** (0.428)*** 
LNY2 -4.482 -0.921 0.002 -3.916 -4.791 
㻌  (0.998)*** (1.463) (1.989) (0.952)*** (0.772)*** 
LNP1 0.875 0.787 1.111 1.005 1.058 
㻌  (0.553) (0.508) (0.519)** (0.513)** (0.336)*** 
LNP2 0.245 0.664 0.549 0.265 0.118 
㻌  (0.580) (0.563) (0.596) (0.516) (0.294) 
LNP3 1.896 1.869 0.734 2.444 2.420 
㻌  (0.753)** (0.835)** (0.954) (0.713)*** (0.484)*** 
LNY1_2 -0.358 -0.128 -0.030 -0.316 -0.375 
㻌  (0.093)*** (0.129) (0.166) (0.088)*** (0.069)*** 
LNY2_2 -0.619 -0.363 -0.006 -0.599 -0.654 
㻌  (0.190)*** (0.259) (0.349) (0.183)*** (0.140)*** 
LNY1LNY2 0.592 0.260 0.021 0.547 0.622 
㻌  (0.142)*** (0.176) (0.209) (0.137)*** (0.107)*** 
LNP1_2 0.236 0.246 0.241 0.251 0.252 
㻌  (0.059)*** (0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.040)*** 
LNP2_2 0.032 -0.005 0.041 0.019 0.023 
㻌  (0.075) (0.070) (0.072) (0.067) (0.042) 
LNP3_2 -0.315 -0.298 -0.287 -0.378 -0.401 
㻌  (0.150)** (0.139)** (0.144)** (0.138)*** (0.090)*** 
LNP1LNP2 0.146 0.185 0.218 0.129 0.111 
㻌  (0.055)*** (0.051)*** (0.053)*** (0.052)** (0.033)*** 
LNP2LNP3 0.264 0.285 0.391 0.218 0.201 
㻌  (0.092)*** (0.087)*** (0.092)*** (0.086)** (0.060)*** 
LNP1LNP3 0.054 0.069 0.062 0.067 0.061 
㻌  (0.064) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.039) 
LNY1LNP1 -0.015 -0.031 -0.067 -0.026 -0.020 
㻌  (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)** (0.028) (0.018) 
LNY1LNP2 -0.098 -0.077 -0.036 -0.100 -0.108 
㻌  (0.036)*** (0.037)** (0.043) (0.031)*** (0.020)*** 
LNY1LNP3 0.018 -0.005 0.025 -0.006 -0.001 
㻌  (0.048) (0.055) (0.066) (0.043) (0.028) 
LNY2LNP1 0.017 0.052 0.079 0.030 0.019 
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(0.037) (0.035) (0.035)** (0.035) (0.022)
LNY2LNP2 0.165 0.094 0.004 0.172 0.199
(0.052)*** (0.053)* (0.059) (0.047)*** (0.034)***
LNY2LNP3 -0.162 -0.111 -0.063 -0.142 -0.147
(0.065)** (0.065)* (0.072) (0.060)** (0.041)***
D1 -0.070 -0.066 -0.058 -0.072 -0.077
(0.026)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)** (0.027)*** (0.019)***
D2 -0.153 -0.140 -0.151 -0.150 -0.154
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.016)***
D3 -0.157 -0.124 -0.120 -0.154 -0.176
(0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.018)***
LNT 29.105 25.595 41.691 25.778 28.311
(5.925)*** (5.731)*** (6.851)*** (5.435)*** (0.396)***
THERMAL 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.008
(0.002)*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)*** (0.002)***
NUCLEAR -0.002 -0.011 -0.008 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)*** (0.004)* (0.003) (0.002)
NEW 0.055 0.230 0.366 0.009 -0.052
(0.082) (0.087)*** (0.091)*** (0.077) (0.052)
ߪ௨ 0.103 0.114
ߪ௩ଶ 0.002 0.003
ߪ௨ଶ 0.011 0.013
ߪ ൌ ටߪ௩ଶ ߪ௨ଶΤ 0.114 0.125
ɉ ൌ ߪ௨ ߪ௩Τ 2.132 2.268
(0.274)*** (0.194)***
Log likelihood 416.951 425.997 456.417 421.313 420.321
Notes:
(1) For each explanatory variable and , the first line reports the estimated coefficient, and the second line reports the standard error.
(2) *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
6. Concluding remarks
This study measures the impact of liberalization on the cost efficiency of electricity production in Japan,
and examines whether or not economies of scope exist between electricity generation and transmission.  The
estimation results suggest that production costs have fallen significantly following each of the three entry-
related liberalizations and the existence of economies of scope on average.  One notable result is that the 
coefficient of the time trend is negative.  This may means that the existence of a factor(s) which have been 
reduced cost efficiencies. There is a possibility of  improving the inefficient factors by further liberalization
in electricity generation and distribution. The structural separation of the transmission sector of electricity
from the generation of electric power, which has been discussed recently, is one example for the further 
liberalization. However, considering the existence of the scope of economies between the generation sector 
and the transmission sector, the other kind of liberalization should be introduced.
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 Table 4. Estimated results 
Firm Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
㻌  㻌  㻌  㻌  㻌  
Hokkaido -4.700E-02 2.312E-02 -8.927E-02 -4.843E-03 
Tohoku -2.979E-02 2.459E-02 -6.661E-02 1.770E-02 
Tokyo -8.396E-03 1.957E-02 -3.700E-02 3.011E-02 
Chubu -2.276E-02 2.549E-02 -6.227E-02 2.377E-02 
Hokuriku -4.620E-02 3.496E-02 -1.096E-01 1.569E-02 
Kansai -9.594E-03 2.049E-02 -4.345E-02 2.766E-02 
Chugoku -3.300E-02 2.750E-02 -7.447E-02 2.050E-02 
Shikoku -3.295E-02 2.426E-02 -7.375E-02 1.633E-02 
Kyushu -2.693E-02 2.258E-02 -5.729E-02 1.731E-02 
All -2.848E-02 2.795E-02 -1.096E-01 3.011E-02 
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